基于博弈视角的国家审计风险分析  

Analysis of National Audit Risk from Gaming Perspective

作　　者：赵息[1] 张世鹏[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,邮政编码300072 [2]审计署企业审计司

出　　处：《审计研究》2015年第6期31-36,共6页Auditing Research

摘　　要：国家审计是受托经营管理者、审计人员、审计机关和审计委托方四方博弈的过程,其间审计风险的产生根源就是信息不对称。本文以信息不对称为基础,通过构建这四个局中人的多阶段动态博弈模型,分析了国家审计各参与方的行为选择和影响因素,及各决策策略对应的收益成本。在此基础上建立了博弈决策树,进而计算分析了受托经营管理者采取合规经营、审计人员采取合规审计、审计机关实施高质量管理、审计委托方实施高质量监督的博弈策略条件,以及影响策略选择的关键因素。根据博弈结果分析,提出了提高国家审计质量、控制审计风险的主要措施:加大对受托经营管理者违规的惩罚力度,强化对审计人员的监督考核,改进审计方式方法,加强审计信息的公开和监督等。National audit is a gaming process of 4 players-government entrusted management, auditors, audit insti- tutions and audit assignment of entrusting party, among which the information asymmetry is the root cause of audit risks. By constructing a multi-stage dynamic gaming model among these players, this paper analyzes their behavior selection and influencing factors, and corresponding benefit and cost of each decision strategy, on the basis of infor- mation asymmetry. Then a gaming tree for decision-making is built, and different equilibrium conditions for gaming strategy by different players - compliance operation by government entrusted management, compliance audit by auditors, high-quality management by audit institutions, and high-quality supervision by the entrusting party-are calculated and analyzed as well as key factors for strategy selection. According to the result of gaming analysis, it recommends some measures to improve audit quality and control audit risk by increasing punishment to government entrusted management for their irregularities, strengthening the supervision and assessment over auditors, improving auditing methods and methodologies, and enhancing the disclosure and supervision of audit information, etc.

关 键 词：国家审计风险 信息不对称 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学]