激励性规制:我国低碳消费直接补贴政策的逆向选择问题研究(上)  

Incentive Regulation: The Problem of Reverse Option about Low-carbon Consumer Subsidy in China

作　　者：崔风暴[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092 [2]宜宾学院经济与管理学院,四川宜宾644007

出　　处：《宜宾学院学报》2015年第10期61-69,共9页Journal of Yibin University

基　　金：2012年国家社会科学基金西部项目"我国低碳政策体系优化及演进路径研究"(12XJY014)

摘　　要："节能惠民工程"消费直接补贴政策虽已退出市场,但所存在的"骗补"行为为该政策的重启蒙上了阴影,破解直补政策中的逆向选择问题是有效遏制"骗补"行为的根本路径。根据委托—代理理论,我国低碳消费直补政策相当于由政府、家电厂商和家电消费者三方缔结而成的激励规制合约,通过对其建立单一规制目标合约的优化模型并求解可知:厂商在参与合约的情况下可获得信息租金,而且厂商的逆向选择行为对政府最优规制没有影响,以及消费者低碳努力程度的上限受到操作者逆向选择行为的影响,这说明家电厂商在销量、产品节能水平甚至定价上存在显性隐蔽行为,并对政策的减排效应产生影响。The efficient project to benefit people as direct consumer subsidy policy , four years later , was stopped, but the subsidy swindles could overshadow renewing the policy , so to solve the Reverse Option issue of subsidy policy is the basic route can to effectively prevent the swindles .According to principalagent theory , the policy amounted to the incentive regulation contract by low carbon consumers , government and enterprises .under ingle regulated target , if go through with the deal ,enterprises can gain information rent , their reverse options hadn ’ t any influence to government ’ s optimum regulation , but did it to consumers ’ best reduction effort , enterprises ’ actual sales , energy efficiency , price were hidden , which weaken the ef-ficient policy ’ s effect .

关 键 词：逆向选择 激励性规制 消费补贴 低碳消费 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]