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出 处:《金融研究》2015年第10期64-80,共17页Journal of Financial Research
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目批准号:71273014);数量经济与数理金融教育部重点实验室(北京大学)的资助
摘 要:本文对省以下各级政府间的税收分成及其影响因素进行了系统研究。我们首先整理和描述了分税制改革以来各主要税种在省以下各级政府之间的分成比例及其演变,然后考察了省本级政府、市本级政府税收分成比例的决定因素。估计结果表明,无论是省本级政府还是市本级政府,对企业的控制程度越高,其各项税收的分成比例越高。下辖行政区域的经济发展不平等程度越高,省本级政府分成的税收比例越多。一个地区的工业化程度趋向于提高辖区本级政府的增值税分成比例,降低营业税分成比例。我们认为,省以下各级政府间的税收分成比例提供了一个衡量政府间财政分权的替代性指标,无论从理论还是实证的角度看都要优于现有文献所流行的衡量指标。This paper investigates the tax sharing rates among sub - provincial governments systematically. We start with describing the stylized facts of tax sharing among sub - provincial governments since the 1994 tax re- form. Then we investigate the determinants of tax sharing rates. Our results show that for both province - level and prefecture - level governments, they hold higher shares if they have larger control over industrial firms in their jurisdictions. For province - level government, the more serious the economic inequality of sub - provin- cial regions, the lager sharing rates they have. The higher level governments tend to have higher shares on value - added taxes and lower shares on business taxes if their jurisdictions have a higher degree of industrialization. From the viewpoint of economic theory and empirical application, we believe that the tax sharing rates among sub - provincial governments can serve as an alternative index of fiscal decentralization.
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