政策不连续性与财政效率损失——来自地方官员变更的经验证据  

Policy Discontinuity and Fiscal Efficiency Loss :Empirical Evidence from China's Municipal Official Turnover

作　　者：杨海生[1,2] 才国伟[1,2] 李泽槟 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院 [2]中山大学中国转型与开放经济研究所

出　　处：《管理世界》2015年第12期12-23,187,共12页Journal of Management World

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金项目(2014A030313133);国家自然科学基金项目(71372146;71572203);国家社科重大项目(15ZDA014);广东省软科学项目(2012B070300029;2015A070704019);中山大学和广东省优秀青年教师培养计划(14wkpy44;Yq2013001);教育部人文社科规划项目(13YJA790001)的资助

摘　　要：“中国特色联邦主义”、“晋升锦标赛”从财政分权和政治晋升的角度解释中国的增长奇迹，然而无论在哪种机制下，地方官员的更替都会造成地方经济政策的不连续，进而导致资源配置扭曲与财政效率损失。本文首先建立了一套财政效率评价指标体系，利用随机前沿法对1999～2012年31个省份的地方财政效率进行测算，然后搜集了同时期各个地级市党政领导的简历资料，采用地级市官员变更比例作为政策不连续性的代理变量，考察了政策不连续性对财政效率的影响。结果显示：（1）由地方官员变动导致的政策不连续性显著降低了地方的财政效率，这种影响以地级市市长变更最为显著。每有一位市长更替，将导致该省份财政效率下降约0．15个百分点。（2）市长任期对财政效率有U型影响，新市长上任1年肉，官员任期对财政效率产生负影响，因为换届过渡时政策不连续最明显，1年后地方财政效率逐步回升。（3）新任市长为快速做出政绩，短期内会实施大量新政，致使政府消费扩大、财政赤字扩张，引致财政效率损失。Chinese style federalism and Promotion Tournament Model try to explain the economic growth miracle in China from the perspectives of fiscal decentralization and political promotion. However, regardless of mechanism undertaken,the turnover of local officials usually causes discontinuity in local economic policies, which results in distortion of resource allocation and loss of fiscal efficiency. This paperfirst establishes a set of evaluation indices to measure local fiscal efficiency in 31 provinces from 1999 to 2012 by stochastic frontier approaches. Afterward, we collect party and government leaders' resume information in the prefecture-level cities, employ a proxy variable based on the turnover ratio of municipal officials, and study the impacts of policy discontinuity on fiscal efficiency. Results show that:(1)policy discontinuity resulted from local official turnovers significantly reduces local fiscal efficiency, with a greater effect caused by municipal mayor turnovers. More specifically, local fiscal efficiency would drop by 0.15% approximately when there was one shift in mayors.(2)The municipal mayors' tenure has a U-shaped influence on fiscal efficiency.Mayors' term of office less than 1 year has a negative impact on fiscal efficiency, but such influence reversed as the term of office exceeds 1 year.(3)Newly-appointed mayors usually have strong incentives to make political achievements, which lead them to expand government expenditures or enlarge fiscal deficits, especially at the initial stage of their tenures, which generally causes the loss of fiscal efficiency.

关 键 词：地方官员变更 政策不连续性 财政效率 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]