加强人民银行内部再监督的必要性研究：基于博弈论工具的视角  

Study on Necessity of Strengthening the Internal Re-supervision in PBOC:From the Perspective of Game Theory Tools

作　　者：师自国[1,2] 吴兴旺[3] 

机构地区：[1]国家行政学院,北京100800 [2]中国人民银行纪委、派驻监察局,北京100800 [3]中国人民银行西安分行,陕西西安710075

出　　处：《金融理论与实践》2015年第12期41-46,共6页Financial Theory and Practice

基　　金：中国人民银行2015年度重点课题《运用大数据方法加强人民银行内部再监督研究》阶段性成果

摘　　要：个体的有限理性、逐利动机、多重委托代理关系以及监督部门和主责部门之间的利益冲突,内在要求必须加强监督。由于人民银行业务部门和监督部门之间的信息不对称,监督部门基于成本收益的衡量,有赖于严格监督的动机,岗位(廉政)风险会在一定程度内被容忍。借用博弈论工具,分析了上述的微观机理,并从理论上论证了通过建立再监督机制,可以有效解决这一问题。最后提出了再监督充分发挥作用的条件,建议利用大数据思维,建立监督信息系统,破解监督工作的信息不对称。There are interest conflicts existing in supervision departments and primary responsibility department of PBOC, and also the bounded rationality of individuals, profit motive and multi-agency relationship, which require the strengthen supervision from the inherent requirement. Because the information asymmetry between the business seetor and supervision department, in the measurement of costs and benefits from the supervision department, the risk of post will be tolerated in a certain extent from the motive of lazy strict supervision. This paper analyzed the above microseopic mechanism with the game tools and demonstrated that by building the re-supervision mechanism to solve this problem effectively in theory. At last the author proposed the condition for full display of re-supervision, he suggested building the supervising system by using the big data thinking, in order to break Supervision of asymmetric information.

关 键 词：内部监督 再监督 博弈 

分 类 号：F830.31[经济管理—金融学]