频谱拍卖的最优竞价策略研究  

Optimal bidding strategy research of the spectrum auctions

作　　者：万晓榆[1] 王梦莉[1] 刘波[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆邮电大学,重庆400065

出　　处：《重庆邮电大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第6期826-831,共6页Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：通信软科学研究项目(2012-R-51)~~

摘　　要：以在频谱拍卖中为电信运营企业提供最优竞价策略为思路,在前期相关研究的基础上,根据频谱对电信运营企业的价值分布特点,运用不完全信息静态博弈理论,构建了优化后的频谱拍卖竞价博弈模型,并通过仿真以数值解的形式求得该竞价博弈模型的纳什均衡。通过均衡分析发现:电信运营企业在频谱拍卖中的最优竞价是关于其自身估价、所有竞拍企业估价的集中趋势、估价的波动幅度和参加竞拍企业数的综合折算值。而且电信运营企业对频谱估价的集中趋势和波动幅度同向激励其均衡出价;企业的单位估价对其均衡出价的激励作用在超过临界值后会随着所有电信运营企业估价的集中趋势和波动幅度的增大而不断增大。Considering the telecommunication operation enterprise,we took how to choose the optimal bidding strategy as the train of thought. On the basis of the previous related research,according to the value distribution characteristics of spectrum to the enterprise,using incomplete information static game theory,we constructed the operating enterprise bidding game model based on the partial distribution,and obtained model＇s Nash equilibrium through the simulation with numerical solutions of the form. At the same time,through the equilibrium analysis we have found： the optimal bidding of the telecommunication operation enterprise is a comprehensive value of its valuation on the spectrum,valuation central tendency,valuation fluctuation of all the participants and the number of the participants in the spectrum auctions. And the enterprise＇s valuation central tendency and fluctuation can positively motivate its equilibrium bid. The incentive function of enterprise＇s unit valuation to its equilibrium price is growing as the enterprise central tendency of valuation and fluctuation amplitude of valuation increasing after surpass the critical value.

关 键 词：频谱拍卖 评估 竞价策略 

分 类 号：TP391[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术] F224.32[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]