Is It About Time to Rethink American Extended Deterrence？  

作　　者：Nursin Atesoglu GUNEY 

机构地区：[1]Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey

出　　处：《International Relations and Diplomacy》2014年第1期55-65,共11页国际关系与外交（英文版）

摘　　要：In today＇s complex web of relations due to the end of the confrontation between the East and West, nuclear materials, technologies, know-how, and scientists have been diffused to states and non-state actors that act irrationally most of the time. The precedent example of nuclear North Korea has given rise to new concerns like whether the low levels of military casualties stemming from nuclear or near-nuclear capable countries will damage the credibility of US/North Atlantic Treaty Organization （NATO） extended deterrence. The ambiguity about how the future of the Iranian Geneva interim agreement will be finalized certainly feeds such kinds of concerns among Tehran＇s neighbors. Till now, both Turkey and South Korea have directly felt and lived through similar kinds of threats. It is true that, during the Cold War years, these two countries have enjoyed the benefit of American assured nuclear security guarantee. However, the current US/NATO extended deterrence due to the mentioned newly arising threats of our times has fallen short of stopping the skirmishes that are occurring at low levels of confrontation. That is why this paper will try to analyze and compare South Korean and Turkish cases so as to comprehend whether there is a necessity to re-think extended deterrence mechanisms that are differently dispatched to meet Ankara＇s and Seoul＇s peculiar security needs.

关 键 词：extended deterrence Weapon of mass destruction ANKARA SEOUL Iran South Korea low levels of skirmishes 

分 类 号：D8[政治法律—政治学]