Coordination, Compromise, and Change： A Case of US-Japan Conflict Over Commercial Whaling  

作　　者：Takashi Sekiyama 

机构地区：[1]Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan

出　　处：《International Relations and Diplomacy》2014年第5期310-322,共13页国际关系与外交（英文版）

摘　　要：This paper, for the goal of revealing the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination, will focus on US-Japan conflict over commercial whaling. The regime like the international whaling regulation, where countries agree in general but disagree on coordination methods, is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has been believed that in regimes presented as the Battle of the Sexes （BoS） situation, once the countries could somehow coordinate their interests and reach an agreement on the specific method of coordination, neither country would have the incentive to withdraw from that agreement. This case study, however, shows that this belief is not always true. From the analysis of this study, it will be concluded that coordination methods change over time even in regimes where the countries agree in general and disagree on coordination methods. In this case, ＂power,＂ ＂institution＂ and ＂consensus＂ are pointed out as incentives to make the two countries accept a specific coordination method.

关 键 词：the Battle of the Sexes （BoS） International Whaling Commission （IWC） The United States JAPAN COORDINATION COMPROMISE 

分 类 号：D8[政治法律—政治学]