纵向产品差异化市场古诺博弈模型的稳定性分析  

Stability analysis in a Cournot game model with vertical production differentiation

作　　者：王静[1] 周学立[2] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁师范大学数学学院,辽宁大连116029 [2]上海大学理学院数学系,上海200444

出　　处：《辽宁师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第4期460-463,共4页Journal of Liaoning Normal University:Natural Science Edition

摘　　要：产品差异化是指企业向市场提供同类产品具有不完全的替代性,主要分为纵向差异和横向差异,而纵向差异化一般指产品在质量级别上的差异.考虑一个生产高质量产品的企业与一个生产低质量产品的企业在市场上进行古诺竞争的双寡头模型,并假设竞争双方对未来产量采用不同的期望规则:其中一方采用静态预期,另外一方采用有限理性预期.利用演化博弈方法,研究2个不同动态系统各自纳什均衡点的局部稳定性,为现实企业的产量决策提供理论依据.Production differentiation refers to the imperfect substitutability of the similar products supplied by the enterprise,including vertical and horizontal differentiation.In general,vertical product differentiation means the differentiation in quality.Based on the Cournot duopoly model in which one firm produces the high-quality product and the other produces the low-quality product.Assume that the competitors adopt different expectations,namely,bounded rational and naive expectation respectively.Using the evolutionary game theory,the local stability properties of the Nash equilibriums are analyzed for two dynamic systems.The conclusions obtained in the paper can provide the enterprise with theories of output decision.

关 键 词：纵向产品差异化 有限理性 静态期望 古诺竞争 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]