多影响因素下经评审的最低价中标法博弈机制分析  

Analysis on the Game Mechanism of the Appraised Lowest-price Tendering Under Multi-factor Influence

作　　者：白庶[1] 寇倩茜 李朔[1] 李闫岩[1] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳建筑大学,辽宁沈阳110168

出　　处：《建筑经济》2015年第12期87-90,共4页Construction Economy

基　　金：辽宁省教育厅人文社科课题"经评审的最低价中标法制度缺陷及其改善机制研究"(W20144083);住建部软科学课题"最低价中标法的制度缺陷及其改善机制研究"(2014-R3-013)

摘　　要：运用博弈论的思想,分析经评审的最低价中标法的作用机理;结合多属性拍卖的相关理论,对纯价格博弈模型进行拓展,考虑价格与非价格因素的最优组合,寻找投标人的均衡策略;分析博弈结果、掌握经评审的最低价中标法的规制特点,为改善经评审的最低价中标法实施效果提供理论依据。Using game theory,this paper analyzes the basic game model for the mechanism of appraised lowestprice tendering method. And combined with the theory of the multi-attributes bid mechanism,expands the pure price game model,considers the optimal portfolio of the price and qualities to seek the equilibrium optimal strategies. Finally,through analyzing the game results and grasping the regulation characteristics of appraised lowest-price tendering method,provides a theoretical basis of improvement of the appraised lowest-price tendering method＇s implementation effect.

关 键 词：最低价中标 多因素 改进机制 博弈理论 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]