农村灌溉用水纠纷群体性事件演化博弈研究  

Research on Evolutionary Game of Group Events in Rural Irrigation Water Dispute

作　　者：周晔[1] 周成[2] 韩振燕[2] 蔡栋[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏警官学院治安管理系,南京210031 [2]河海大学公共管理学院,南京211100

出　　处：《湖北农业科学》2015年第22期5766-5769,共4页Hubei Agricultural Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(10BRK001);江苏省公安厅公安理论及软科学项目;江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究项目(2013SJB6300024);江苏警官学院科学研究项目(13Q17;13Q18);江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目

摘　　要：将参与农村灌溉用水纠纷群体性事件的双方分成强势群体和弱势群体,构建两者的演化博弈模型,分析两者的复制动态、演化稳定策略和博弈系统的稳定性。结果表明,双方的期望得益、弱势群体争夺灌溉用水权的成本以及强势群体妥协灌溉用水权所遭受的损失程度是影响双方演化均衡稳定策略的主要因素,从长期来看,强势群体和弱势群体博弈的演化稳定均衡策略是弱势群体选择争夺用水权,而强势群体则采取妥协策略。基于此,提出通过提高弱势群体的收益水平,保障他们的水权分配话语权,积极回应用水诉求,避免农村灌溉用水纠纷群体性事件发生。Dividing the participants in group events of rural irrigation water dispute into strong group and vulnerable group, an evolutionary game model between two was constructed, to analyze the replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy of both sides, as well as the stability of the evolutionary game system. The results showed that the evolutionarily stable equilibrium between strong group and vulnerable group were mainly affected by the expected return, the contention cost of vulnerable group and the yielding losses of strong group. In the long term, the game＇s evolutionary stable strategy was that the vulnerable group chose to dispute irrigation water rights while strong group chose to yield. Based on this, several solutions to avoid group events in rural irrigation water dispute were put forward.

关 键 词：农村灌溉用水 群体性事件 强势群体 弱势群体 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]