贿赂犯罪的行为经济学分析  

Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis on Bribery

作　　者：余高能[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学法学院,陕西西安710127

出　　处：《未来与发展》2015年第12期55-57,33,共4页Future and Development

基　　金：2014年陕西省教育厅项目"贿赂犯罪刑事立法的博弈分析"(项目编号14JK1691)

摘　　要：切实有效的反贿赂犯罪立法应当以行为主义法与经济学理论为指导,以对贿赂犯罪的充分认识和理解为前提。贿赂犯罪涉及行贿人和受贿双方人、社会公众以及国家等多方主体的一系列决策互动和博弈。贿赂犯罪具有行为的秘密性和交易的非对等性;行贿人与受贿人各自面临双重风险和信赖问题,同时存在相互依赖性和互惠倾向;双方各自都面临着两种困境,既有合作的空间又存在一定的对抗性;双方既追求利益最大化又存在报复心理;贿赂犯罪具有受害人的间接性和社会危害的模糊性。在发现贿赂犯罪的两种渠道中,内部自首比外部侦查更为有效。Effective anti-bribery law should be guided by behavioral law and economics theory and based on complete knowledge and thorough understanding of bribery offence itself. Bribery involves a series of interactions between the briber, the hribee , the general public and the State. The trade between the briber and the bribee is asymmetric. While both parties face trust issue and double risks, they also depend on each other and have reciprocity tendency. They are money- r yet also have revenge sentiment. The victim of bribery tends to be indirect and ambiguous. Self-reporting is practically more important than external detection among bribery discovery channels.

关 键 词：贿赂犯罪 行为经济学 贿赂困境 决策空间 自首 

分 类 号：DF636[政治法律—刑法学]