真实盈余管理与审计师认知  

Real Earnings Management and Auditor Cognition

作　　者：蔡利[1] 毕铭悦[1] 蔡春[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院/中国政府审计研究中心,611130

出　　处：《会计研究》2015年第11期83-89,97,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71402146和71272246);教育部人文社会科学项目(12YJC790002)的阶段性成果;西南财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(JBK150925和JBK1307076)的资助

摘　　要：本文以2008-2013年A股上市公司为对象,考察审计师对真实盈余管理的认知。具体探讨:审计师能否识别真实盈余管理;审计师对真实盈余管理客户的辞聘或保留决策选择;以及审计师应对真实盈余管理带来风险的策略等三个问题。研究表明,审计师能够识别真实盈余管理,并将真实盈余管理作为风险因素在审计定价决策中加以考虑;会计师事务所对真实盈余管理带来的风险现阶段整体可控,事务所倾向于采取客户保留决策;事务所主要通过审计师付出额外的努力和更换审计团队两种策略来降低审计风险。本文的研究结果为理解审计师对真实盈余管理的认知提供了直接的经验证据,对于从审计角度强化真实盈余管理的监管提供了政策参考依据。This paper explores how the auditors perceive real earnings management(REM)with a sample of A shares listed companies in China for fiscal years2008 through 2013.We test whether auditors can recognize the consequence of REM to audit risk first,then examine the effect of REM on auditors' client-retention decisions,and investigate how auditors reduce risk associated with REM at last.We find that auditors perceive REM as a risk factor,so that auditors increase audit fees for risks associated with REM,and auditors retain clients with REM through providing additional audit effort and changing audit team to reduce risk associated with REM.Our additional analysis shows that,auditors have the different response at the different level of REM to support the evidence that auditors have perceived REM as a risk factor.

关 键 词：真实盈余管理 审计师认知 审计费用 会计师事务所变更 审计团队更换 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F239.4