我国上市公司并购议价能力的量化研究  

The Quantitative Analysis of Bargaining Power of Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：赵玮[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2015年第12期21-26,34,共6页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：本文利用2003～2013年上市公司数据，测度了我国并购交易市场上的信息不对称程度，分析了我国上市公司在并购过程中的议价能力对并购交易价格的影响机制。研究结果表明：（1）主并购方上市公司的讨价还价能力使成交价格比公允价格降低48．9％，而被并购方企业的议价能力导致成交价格较公允价格高出43．3％，两者的净效果造成我国上市公司并购价格低于公允价格5．6％。（2）进一步研究表明，在国内并购市场中，我国上市公司面临的成交价格相对于公允价格下降7．1％，在海外并购市场中，需要比公允价格多支出5．5％的资金才能完成一例跨国并购事件，我国上市公司在国内并购交易中表现良好，而在在跨国并购交易中处于谈判劣势。This paper employs two-tier stochastic frontier model to measure overseas M＆A bargaining power of Chinese listed companies, followed by empirical tests based on data of listed companies from 2003 to 2013. The empirical results show that： （1） the bargaining power of the listed companies makes the M＆A price lower about 48.9% than the equilibrium price, the objective enterprises＇ bargaining power makes the M＆A price to about 43.3% higher than the equilibrium price, the final game result is our M＆A price about 5.6% lower than the equilibrium price. （2） Further research shows that in the domestic M＆A market, the listed companies will receive M＆A price which is 7.1% lower than the equilibrium price. While in the overseas M＆A, almost all the listed companies have to receive M＆A price which is 5.5% higher than the equilibrium price.

关 键 词：国内并购 跨国并购 并购议价 双边随机边界模型 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]