政府干预、管理层自利与国企过度投资  

Government Intervention,Managerial Entrenchment and Over-investment of State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：佟爱琴[1] 李雨佳[1] 杨柳[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《南京审计学院学报》2016年第1期77-85,共9页journal of nanjing audit university

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71402120)

摘　　要：利用我国上市企业2009—2014年数据,从企业外部和内部探寻引起国企过度投资的原因,并探讨最终控制人对国企过度投资的影响,结果表明:现阶段国有企业依然存在过度投资的现象;政府干预是导致国企过度投资的外部因素,管理层自利是引起国企过度投资的内部因素,二者与国企过度投资均呈显著正相关关系;与政府机构控制的国有企业相比,国有公司控制的国有企业过度投资更为严重。Using the sample data of listed companies from 2009 to 2014,this paper not only studies the reason of over-invest-ment in state-owned enterprises from internal and external aspects,but also studies how ultimate controller influences the over-investment of state-owned enterprises. The results indicate that in the state-owned enterprises,over-investment still exists. Government intervention is the external factor which may lead to the over-investment of state-owned enterprises and managerial entrenchment is the internal factor. Both of the two factors show a significantly positive correlation with over-investment. And the enterprises subject to the state-owned enterprises are inclined to over-investment,compared to the enterprises subject to government institution.

关 键 词：政府干预 管理层自利 国有企业过度投资 最终控制人 企业投资效率 非效率投资 公司治理 公司投资行为 

分 类 号：F20[经济管理—国民经济] F275