信息不对称的市场感知与银行借款契约——以分析师预测为视角  

Market Perception of Information Asymmetry and Bank Loan Contract—— From the Perspective of Analyst Forecast

作　　者：李志刚[1] 施先旺[1] 谢建[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2015年第9期11-32,共22页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金"分析师报告内在特质与资本市场效率研究"(13CGL031)对本研究的资助

摘　　要：本文手工搜集企业的单笔银行借款利率、期限、金额信息,从市场的角度研究信息不对称对银行借款契约的影响,并进一步从信息供给方和需求方两个角度,分析这种影响在不同特征的公司和银行间是否有差异。研究发现,分析师预测准确度(离散度)与借款利率负(正)相关,与借款期限、借款金额正(负)相关;银行性质、公司上市年限会对分析师预测与银行借款契约之间的关系产生影响。本文从市场感知的角度证明了信息不对称对银行借款契约的重要意义,丰富了分析师预测经济后果的研究。This paper use enterprises＇ every single bank loan rate, term and amount to tests the influence of perception of mar- ket information asymmetry on bank loan contract. The result shows that analysts forecast accuracy （dispersion） negatively （posi- tively） correlated with interest rate, positively （negatively） correlated with loan term and amount. Further study finds that the nature of banks and the listing time of company has an impact on the relationship between analysts forecast and bank loan con- tract. This paper from the perspective of market to prove the significance of information asymmetry on bank loan contract and enriches the research of economic consequences of analyst forecast.

关 键 词：分析师预测 信息不对称 银行借款契约 国有四大行 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]