区域环境保护行动的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis of regional environmental protection programme

作　　者：金帅[1,2] 杜建国[1,2] 盛昭瀚[2] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,镇江212013 [2]南京大学社会科学计算实验中心,南京210093

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2015年第12期3107-3118,共12页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71201071;71373105);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(12YJCZH090);中国博士后科学基金(2013M531293)

摘　　要：利用演化博弈模型,分析了博弈主体动态支付条件下区域环境保护行动的演化过程.研究结果表明,系统演化具有多重复杂路径,在很大程度上取决于双种群的初始状态及其相互激励关系.进而,识别了区域环境保护行动有效实施的边界条件与充要条件;在此基础上,结合我国环境保护的具体国情,提出相应的改进措施与政策建议.The dynamic evolution process of regional environmental protection programme is analyzed based on an evolutionary game model,where the payoff matrix is dynamic rather than static.The results show that the evolution of system has multiple equilibriums,and the evolutionary stable strategies are largely affected by the initial population states and mutual incentive situations of both the government and social subject.Furthermore,the boundary conditions as well as the necessary and sufficient conditions for the effective enforcement of regional environmental protection programme are identified.Finally,some relative policy recommendations are proposed according to China＇s environmental protection situation.

关 键 词：区域环境保护 动态支付矩阵 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] X32[环境科学与工程—环境工程]