地方政府与煤矿企业安全生产协作的互惠博弈模型  

Reciprocal Game Model of Safety Production Cooperative Relationship between Local Government and Coal Mine

作　　者：周婷婷[1] 方乐[1] 马晓南[2] 刘德海[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学,大连116025 [2]中国银行深圳分行,深圳518000

出　　处：《电子科技大学学报（社科版）》2015年第6期37-43,共7页Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:71271045;71571033);东北财经大学学科建设支持计划特色学科项目(编号:XKT-201411);东北财经大学科研创新团队培育与扶持计划项目(编号:DUFE2015GY03)

摘　　要：为了摆脱煤矿安全生产面临的"囚徒困境",地方政府除了提供公共安全投资、运用市场干预手段等改变成本收益外,还可以完善安全监管的策略设计,即在囚徒困境的元博弈基础上,通过二阶互惠策略设计将囚徒困境元博弈扩展为具有16×4策略组合的静态博弈模型,建立了地方政府与煤矿企业在安全生产协作的互惠博弈模型。纳什均衡结果为煤矿企业采取安全生产投资的互惠策略(即当地方政府强监管时加大安全投入,否则减少安全投入),地方政府选择强监管策略,从而达成安全生产的帕累托协作结局。最后,结合11.10云南师宗矿难事故的案例,讨论了政府机构如何通过安全生产互惠策略设计,以及改进安全监管、运用税收和财政补贴等市场调节手段,提高煤矿安全生产水平的途径。The paper established the reciprocal game model of collaborative action in production safety between local governments and coalmines. In order to get rid of so-called ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ faced by the coalmine production safety, the local government can design the appropriate strategy to reach the Pareto cooperative outcome, and change the payoffs by providing public security investment and market intervention measures. Taking the martyrdom game as a meta-game and designing two order strategies, the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ martyrdom game is extended to the static game with 16×4 strategies profiles. The local government can choose the strong regulatory strategy, considering the coalmine takes the reciprocal strategy of safety production investment, i.e., facing the strong supervision the coalmine should increase safety input, and it is in reverse. Finally, based on the case of ＂11.10＂ Shizong mine accident, the paper discusses the measures to improve the level of coal mine production safety including strategy design and payoff adjustment such as effective taxation and allowance.

关 键 词：煤矿生产安全 互惠博弈 静态博弈 策略设计 政府监管 

分 类 号：F424.5[经济管理—产业经济]