我国社会信用体系建设“低水平均衡陷阱”现象与对策研究  

Study on “Low-level Equilibrium Trap”Phenomenon for China's Social Credit System Construction and the Countermeasures

作　　者：李燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京晓庄学院,江苏南京210000

出　　处：《征信》2015年第12期42-47,共6页Credit Reference

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(12CGL079)

摘　　要：当前我国社会信用缺失现象严重,社会信用体系建设工作面临"低水平均衡陷阱"风险。其症结在于政务活动中的信用信息归集与应用工作明显存在逆向激励问题。要走出这一陷阱,必须积极稳妥推进社会信用信息应用,加强组织推动,多管齐下,互动合作,着力加强政务诚信建设,做好政务活动中信用信息的归集与应用。There is a serious phenomenon of social credit defect in China at present. The construction of social credit system is facing the risk of ＂low-level equilibrium trap＂. The crux of the problem lies in obvious reverse incentive problem for credit information collection and application in the administrative activities. To get out of this trap,we must actively and steadily push forward the application of social credit information,strengthen organizational leadership and management through multiple approaches in an interactive and cooperative manner,take great efforts to strengthen the construction of government integrity,and implement well collection and application of government credit information.

关 键 词：社会信用体系 低水平均衡陷阱 信用缺失 政务诚信 社会信用信息 

分 类 号：R832.1[医药卫生—航空、航天与航海医学]