乡镇农自用船舶管理的博弈论模型  

A Game Theory Model of the Self-use Ship of Township Farmers Management

作　　者：廉晨[1,2] 赵辰光[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨师范大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150025 [2]哈尔滨海事局,黑龙江哈尔滨150010

出　　处：《安徽农业科学》2015年第33期319-320,共2页Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences

基　　金：黑龙江省自然科学基金"基于生态环境动态评价的资源型城市发展对策研究--以黑龙江为例"(G201111)资助

摘　　要：从博弈论的角度分析了地方政府与乡镇农自用船舶的船主两个责任主体之间的博弈,结果表明,船主选择违法的概率与政府执法成本成正比,与政府查处违法行为而获得的收入和未能有效查处而受到的惩罚损失成反比,在此基础上对加强农自用船舶安全管理工作提出了建议,即加强立法工作、减少执法成本、有效查处违法行为和加强法制宣传教育。Using the Game theory,this paper analyzed the relationship between local government and the ship owner,the results showed that ship owner illegal probability is proportional to the government law enforcement,and is inversely proportional to the income obtained by investigating and punishing illegal behaviors,as well as the punishment obtained by failing to effectively investigate illegal behaviors. On the basis of this,some suggestions for strengthening self-use ship security management were put forward,namely strengthen the legislative work,reduce the cost of law enforcement,and effectively investigate and punish illegal acts and strengthen the legal system publicity and education.

关 键 词：乡镇农自用船舶 博弈论模型 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：S-9[农业科学]