科学中的例证与假装  

Exemplifi cation and Make-believe in Science

作　　者：李元明[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2016年第1期56-60,共5页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家留基委中国人民大学-哈佛大学联合培养博士生项目(项目学号:201406360136);国家社科基金重大项目"认知科学对当代哲学的挑战"(项目批准号:11&ZD187)

摘　　要：科学样例和模型都是科学家们在表征外部世界过程中所取得的重要成就。然而,在追求正确刻画科学实践真实面貌的科学哲学事业中,样例很少被纳入哲学思考的视野。基于古德曼关于艺术表征的符号理论,埃尔金完善了例证学说并将其运用于科学领域。她对科学样例的符号分析,丰富了科学实践哲学。由于表征的语言学范式不能很好地处理虚构建模问题,埃尔金试图借助于"贴切的非真"概念来加以解决。然而,进一步的分析表明,她的论证策略存在一系列难以克服的困难。在如何理解虚构与表征问题上,假装理论提供了一个更好的概念框架,可以用于对模型的分析。Both scientific samples and models are important representational achievements in scientific practice. But compared with models, samples get little attention from philosophers of science, who aim to picture scientific practice correctly. Based on Goodman＇s theory of symbols of representation in arts, Elgin＇s refinement of exemplification wasappliedto science. Her symbolic analysis of scientific samples riches the philosophy of scientific practice. Furthermore, she introduces the concept of ＂felicitous falsehoods＂ to analyze issues of fictional models.Since Goodman＇s linguistic paradigm of representation cannot handle them. However, there are severe problems with her strategy of arguing for the exemplifying role of models. The make-believe approach to fiction and representation provides a better conceptual framework for analyzing scientific models.

关 键 词：表征 例证 假装 科学样例 科学模型 

分 类 号：N0[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]