小城镇污水处理厂供给的利益博弈与策略选择  

Interests Game and Strategy Selection in the Supply of Small-Town Sewage Treatment Works

作　　者：管宏友[1] 陈玉成[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南大学资源环境学院,重庆400716

出　　处：《西南大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第12期91-97,共7页Journal of Southwest University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家"十一五"科技支撑计划项目(2010BAD03B03);国家社科基金一般项目(15BMZ098);重庆市社会科学规划一般项目(2014YBSH040);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(SWU113015)

摘　　要：运用博弈论的理论工具,拟建三方重复博弈模型,从利益博弈的视角研究现实中小城镇污水处理厂供给的利益相关者的行为,即政府、企业和市民的供给行为.从选择合适的决策策略、发挥政府的主导作用以及强化供给的利益平衡给出策略选择建议,力图调动各参与主体在小城镇污水处理厂供给中的积极性,以破解小城镇污水处理厂的供给困境,应对农村地区日益恶化的水环境.In this paper,a trilateral repeated-game model is built based on the repeated game theory,so as to study the behaviors of the stakeholders in the supply of small-town sewage treatment works,including the government,the enterprise and the citizens.Based on selecting proper strategies,ensuring the leading role played by the government and strengthening the interest balance of supply,some policy suggestions are offered to motivate the enthusiasm of all subjects involved in the supply of sewage treatment works and to combat the ever-increasing deterioration of water environment in rural areas.

关 键 词：重复博弈 小城镇污水处理厂 供给 利益博弈 

分 类 号：X32[环境科学与工程—环境工程]