养老保险体制改革的动态时间一致性研究  

Time Consistency Principle of Pension Reform

作　　者：邹铁钉[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学经济学院

出　　处：《数量经济技术经济研究》2016年第1期38-57,共20页Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics

基　　金：2015年度浙江省民政政策理论研究规划课题(ZMZC201576)资助

摘　　要：本文构建了一个动态时间一致性模型，并利用中国数据对养老保险体系的动态时间一致性做了经验检验和动态预测。研究发现，按照帕累托效率标准对养老保险体系的参数或结构进行调整只是手段，而提高动态时间一致性才是目的。一项养老改革只有在能够同时增进社会福利和个人投资收益率时，才符合动态时间一致性原则；经验检验表明，1978～2012年间，现收现付制向基金制转轨是不符合动态时间一致性原则的；而1994年之后，将统筹比率控制在0．6～0．75之间，则有利于提高养老保险体系的动态时间一致性。预测结果表明，中国政府在2014～2037年和2038～2044年间应将统筹比率分别控制在0．6～0．9和0．25～0．6之间。This paper employ dynamic time consistency model to analyze the complemen- tary effects between equity and efficiency of pension system. The results indicate that the ad- justment of parameters or structures under Pareto Efficiency Standards is just a mean to pen- sion reform, and strengthening the dynamic time consistency is the final purpose. Only if a pension reform can enhance social welfare and returns on investment of individual at the same time, it conforms to the principle of dynamic time consistency. Empirical tests show that the transforment from Pay-As-You-Go to Fund from 1978 to 2012 is contrary to principle of dy- namic time consistency, and that keeping the ratio of Pay-As-You-Go between 0. 6 and 0. 75 after 1994 conforms to the principle of dynamic time consistency. The predictions show that in order to improve the time consistency, the Chinese Government should keep the ratio of Pay-As-You-Go between 0. 6 and 0. 9 from 2014 to 2037, and keep the ratio between 0. 25 and 0. 6 from 2038 to 2044.

关 键 词：公平 效率 互补效应 养老保险 时间一致性 

分 类 号：F840.67[经济管理—保险]