一种针对分组密码S盒的组合侧信道攻击方法  

Combinational side-channel attack on S-box in block cipher

作　　者：张帅伟[1] 杨晓元[1] 钟卫东[1] 魏悦川[1] 

机构地区：[1]武警工程大学电子技术系网络与信息安全武警部队重点实验室,西安710086

出　　处：《计算机应用研究》2016年第2期498-501,共4页Application Research of Computers

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61202492;61202496)

摘　　要：针对嵌入了FPGA密码芯片的设备在运行算法时泄露的侧信道信息进行了研究,提出一种改进分组密码S盒的组合侧信道攻击方案,该方案由差分功耗攻击、模板攻击和毛刺攻击构成。通过传统的差分功耗攻击确定S盒运行的时间区间,然后针对目标S盒的输入输出利用一个时钟周期内逻辑门毛刺个数与部分功耗线性相关的方法,采用线性模型匹配算法恢复密钥并减少了基于多元高斯模型匹配的计算量,为今后提高侧信道攻击的效率提供依据。Aiming at side-channel information leaked by the cryptoequipment embedded with a FPGA cryptographic chip, this paper proposed an improved combinational side-channel attack of a block cipher consisting of DPA, template attacks and glit- ches attacks in S-box. After being sure of time period of S-box by DPA, it recovered the key through a matching algorithm of linear model to reduce the calculated amount of a matching algorithm of muhivariate Gaussian in terms of the existing linear correlation between the number of glitches and a part of power. And it will give evidence to improve the efficiency of side-chan- nel attacks.

关 键 词：密码芯片 分组密码 S盒 差分功耗攻击 模板攻击 毛刺攻击 匹配算法 

分 类 号：TP309.7[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]