激励性规制:我国低碳消费直接补贴政策的逆向选择问题研究(下)  

Incentive Regulation: The Problem of Reverse Option About Low-carbon Consumer Subsidy in China

作　　者：崔风暴[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092 [2]宜宾学院经济与管理学院,四川宜宾644007

出　　处：《宜宾学院学报》2015年第11期30-35,共6页Journal of Yibin University

基　　金：2012国家社会科学基金西部项目"我国低碳政策体系优化及演进路径研究"(12XJY014)

摘　　要：我国"节能惠民工程"消费直补政策构成了激励规制合约。在规制契约优化过程中,如果考虑多维规制目标,规制合约最优化需要满足"激励约束为紧"的条件,说明厂商的逆向选择行为对政府的最优规制是有影响的。这一结论意味着规制者可以通过惩罚机制和监督机制的设计对逆向选择行为进行矫正,这为我国"节能惠民工程"政策提供了两个方向上的改进办法,即政策目标设计上应以多目标联动为宜和政策机理设计要与多目标联动思想高度契合。The direct consumer subsidy policy of energy-efficient and people-benefit project is an incentive regulation contract. In the optimization process of regulation contract,contract＇s linear restrictions are tight under multidimensional targets,which shows that the enterprises＇ reverse options have important influence on government＇s optimum regulation,and regulator is able to rectify the reverse options by devising punishment and oversight mechanism,which provide two improved measures for the energy-efficient and peoplebenefit project： one is that it is better to devise multi-objective subsidy policy; the other is that the policy making design should agree to the multi-objective linkage mechanism.

关 键 词：逆向选择 激励性规制 消费补贴 低碳消费 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]