涉诉信访博弈模型构建与风险防范策略研究  

Analysis on the risk prevention strategies of prosecution-related letters and visits based on game theory models

作　　者：李雪蓉[1] 王小新[1] 乔晗[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京100190 [2]中国科学院大学数据挖掘与知识管理重点实验室,北京100190

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2016年第1期127-135,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71003057;71373262;71390330;71390331)~~

摘　　要：涉诉信访工作具有复杂性、敏感性等特点,办理工作稍有不慎即会引发危害人民群众生命财产安全的社会问题.本文首次应用博弈论方法分析涉诉信访的风险防范策略,运用不完全信息静态博弈模型分析上访风险事件之前人民法院的案件审理决策;运用不完全信息动态博弈模型分析上访风险事件之后人民法院的初访接访决策.通过求解博弈均衡结果分析得出,人民法院现有的审理接访策略存在不合理因素,建立科学的风险预警体系可以防范涉诉信访风险,有效配置司法资源.本文以人民法院为视角,将博弈论模型均衡结果与风险预警模型相结合,创新性地提出了在司法资源约束下防范涉诉信访风险的应对策略.Because of the complexity, sensitivity and high-risk of prosecution-related letters and visits, any carelessness in reception could cause social problems of harm to people＇s lives and property safety. This paper is the first attempting to analyze risk prevention strategies of prosecution-related letters and visits using game theory models. Static game models of incomplete information are established to analyze trial strategies; dynamic game models of incomplete information are established to analyze reception strategies. The equilibrium outcomes show that there exist unreasonable factors in the reception strategies of the People＇s Court, and scientific early warning systems could prevent risk of prosecution-related letters and visits, and efficiently allocate judicial resources. In the perspective of the People＇s Court, this paper combines equilibrium outcomes of games and risk early warning models, and proposes risk prevention and coping strategies of prosecution-related letters and visits.

关 键 词：涉诉信访 动态博弈 不完全信息 风险防范 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]