腐败的困境:腐败本质的一项实验研究  

The Dilemma of Corruption: A Lab Experiment on the Nature of Corruption

作　　者：姜树广[1,2] 陈叶烽[3,4] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济研究院 [2]深圳证券交易所博士后科研工作站 [3]浙江大学经济学院 [4]浙江大学跨学科社会科学研究中心

出　　处：《经济研究》2016年第1期127-140,共14页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资金资助项目(项目批准号201404);国家社科基金重点项目(13AZD061);国家社科基金青年项目(项目批准号13CJL004);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(项目批准号2015QNA201)

摘　　要：腐败作为人类社会的一大毒瘤而普遍存在于各国的各个历史阶段,破坏社会正义且阻碍经济发展。然而,时至今日我们对腐败本质的认识仍然是滞后的,流行的委托代理的分析框架不足以为反腐败实践提供足够的指导。腐败本质上表现为一定群体的社会困境问题。在经典的贿赂博弈实验背景下,本研究使用实验方法考察了当群体面临"集体失败"风险的腐败决策。研究结果表明,由于个体理性与集体理性的冲突,实验中普遍的腐败行为导致群体陷入平均收益低于无腐败收益的"腐败的悲剧"。本文还对性别、风险态度、信任水平、腐败信念、亲社会性等个体特征在腐败行为的影响进行了考察。Corruption as a cancer of human society has been widely existed in every country in every historical period. Corruption violates social justice and hinders economic development. However, we still know little about the nature of corruption and the popular principle-agent model about corruption cannot provide powerful guidance for anti-corruption practice. We believe one essential aspect of corruption is it reflects a social dilemma problem. This paper investigates the corruption behavior when agents face a risk of ＂group failure＂ with the classic bribery game as background. Due to the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality, pervasive corruption behavior is observed in the experiment, which made the group fall into the trap of ＂the dilemma of corruption＂. The average payoff of participants is less than the reservation payoff if there is no corruption. This paper also investigates the effects of individual characteristics on corruption, including gender, risk preference, trust, corruption beliefs, as well as pro-social propensity, etc.

关 键 词：腐败 社会困境 集体失败 实验 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学]