提升监管强度具有风险抑制效应吗?——来自中国银行业的经验证据  

Bank Risk-Taking and Supervision: Does the Intensity of Supervision Matter? Evidence from China's Banking Industry

作　　者：潘敏[1] 魏海瑞[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济发展研究中心/经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《金融研究》2015年第12期64-80,共17页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目"完善国有控股商业银行公司治理机制研究"(项目编号:10AZD019)的资助

摘　　要：本文从事前、事中和事后监管的监管流程角度出发,运用我国71家商业银行2003年至2013年的非平衡面板数据,实证检验了监管强度提升对商业银行风险承担行为的影响。研究表明,相较于事中现场审查而言,银行业监管部门事前发布监管公文和事后违规惩戒措施实施强度提升的风险抑制效应更为明显。监管强度提升的风险抑制效应对大银行和国有控股商业银行的作用普遍更强。但对于上市银行和非上市银行的影响则存在差异,其中,监管公文发布对上市银行风险承担的抑制效应要弱于非上市银行,而违规惩戒措施的效果与之相反,现场审查对上市、非上市银行的影响则不存在显著差异。Using an unbalanced panel data of China＇ s banking industry from 2003 to 2013, this paper exam- ines effects of the intensity of supervision on bank risk-taking. It shows that, the release of supervisory docu- ments （ex-ante supervision） and the disciplinary punishment （ex-post supervision） are more effective than that of on-site inspection （ in the course supervision） ; The three supervisory behaviors＇ risk inhibitory effects on big banks and large state-owned banks are stronger; The risk inhibitory effects of the ex-ante supervisions on listed banks are weaker than that on non-listed banks, while the effect of disciplinary punishment is reversed and the on-site inspection has no different influence on listed banks and non-listed banks.

关 键 词：监管强度 商业银行风险承担 监管流程 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]