基于Nash讨价还价公平偏好的收益共享契约分析  

An Analysis of Revenue Sharing Contract based on Fairness Preference of Nash Bargaining

作　　者：魏光兴[1] 徐桂霄 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《商业研究》2016年第2期162-169,共8页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目;项目编号:71102165

摘　　要：本文在随机市场需求的一般情形下,同时引入零售商和供应商的公平偏好,以Nash讨价还价为博弈框架,研究公平偏好对收益共享契约协调性的影响,并进行数值模拟分析,结果表明:只有公平偏好强度满足相应条件时,公平偏好才能使收益共享契约实现供应链的协调;当收益共享契约协调供应链时,公平偏好虽然不会改变契约参数以及节点企业最优决策和利润,但是会改变供应链中各主体的预期和效用,因而改变了供应商和零售商协调供应链的心理意愿。In the general condition of stochastic demand, this paper studies the effect of the fairness preference on the coordination extent of the revenue sharing contract and makes the numerical simulation by introducing the fairness prefer- ence of both the retailor and the supplier into the frame of Nash bargaining. It is found that the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain only when the fairness preference meets relevant constraints; when the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, the fairness preference does not change the contract parameters, the optimal de- cision making and the profits of the node enterprises, while it will change the expectations and the utilities of the node enterprises, which changes retailors and the suppliers＇ psychological intentions to coordinate.

关 键 词：Nash讨价还价 公平偏好 收益共享契约 行为供应链 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]