第三方物流外包的信任行为与监督博弈分析  

Analysis of Trust Behavior and Supervision Game of Third Party Logistics Outsourcing

作　　者：王祖琪[1] 孙绍荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《科技与经济》2016年第1期101-105,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目--"行为管理制度漏洞治理设计的工程化方法研究"(项目编号:71171134;项目负责人:孙绍荣)成果之一

摘　　要：基于物流外包中供需双方的合作关系及第三方物流外包的风险与收益,运用博弈论和委托—代理的理论和方法,构建了第三方物流的监督博弈模型,运用混合纳什均衡模型,求出混合策略纳什均衡解,对第三方物流的监督问题进行了定量分析,研究发现:第三方物流外包的信任与监督博弈中无一贯性行为,即在第三方物流体系中,物流供应商是以一定的概率供应合格产品,即所谓的混合策略均衡。而供应合格产品的概率则取决于监管的概率。依据研究结果提出相应的政策和建议,为中国物流需求企业对物流服务企业服务质量的监督和激励提供一定的理论依据和参考。In this paper, based on the relationship between supply and demand side in the logistics outsourcing as well as risk and income of third party logistics outsourcing, a supervision game model of third party logistics is constructed by using Game Theory and Agent Theory. After applying mixed Nash equilibrium model, Nash equilibrium solution of mixed strategy is obtained; the article gives the quantitative analysis of supervision of the third party logistics. The research shows that： there is no evidence of consistent behavior of third party logistics outsourcing trust and supervision game ; it means that in the third party logistics system, logistics supplier sup- plies qualified product with a certain probability, which is called Mixed Strategy Equilibrium. The probability of supplying qualified products depends on the probability of supervision. Finally, corresponding policies and suggestions are made on the basis of research result to serve as theoretical basis and practical references on supervision and motivation of service quality of logistics service enterprises by logistics demand enterprises in China.

关 键 词：物流外包 供需企业 混合策略 纳什均衡 监督博弈 

分 类 号：F259.23[经济管理—国民经济]