价格与服务水平影响市场需求的电信代理渠道协调机制  

Coordination Mechanism of Telecom Agency Channel with Price and Service Level Affecting Market Demand

作　　者：经有国[1] 杨璐[1] 杨世旭[1] 

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,昆明650093

出　　处：《科技与经济》2016年第1期106-110,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目--"需求依赖利率和服务水平的卖方消费信贷与协调机制"(项目编号:71461014;项目负责人:经有国)成果之一;云南省引进人才科研启动基金项目--"定制手机的供应链协调优化研究"(项目编号:KKSY201208049;项目负责人:经有国)成果之一;云南省教育厅重点项目--"基于模块化服务平台面向客户需求的服务配置方法研究"(项目编号:KKJD201208006;项目负责人:经有国)成果之一

摘　　要：考虑由一个电信运营商和一个电信代理商组成的电信代理渠道中,电信运营商处于主导地位,电信业务的市场需求量主要取决于销售价格和电信代理商服务水平,应用动态博弈论理论分别建立电信代理渠道集中决策模型、业务分成契约模型和基于业务分成与努力成本共担的组合式契约模型,最终模型证明了传统的业务分成契约并不能实现渠道的协调,给出了实现渠道协调时的业务分成比率与努力成本分担比率,并提出了实现电信代理渠道帕累托改进的转移支付机制。最后通过算例分析验证了所提出的协调契约的有效性。In a telecom agency channel composed of a telecom operator and a telecom agent, telecom operator is dominant and telecom market demand mainly depends on the sales price and teleeom agency service level; dynamic game theory is applied to estab- lish the centralized decision model of telecom agency channel, the turnover commission contract model and the combined contract model with turnover commission and effort cost sharing. Through solving the above three models, the conclusion is proved that traditional com- mission contract cannot achieve telecom agency channel coordination. The ratios of turnover commission and effort cost sharing which can coordinate the telecom agency channel are provided, and the transfer payment mechanism to achieve Pareto improvement of telecom agency channel is proposed. Finally, a numerical example is used to verify the results and effectiveness of the proposed coordination contract.

关 键 词：电信代理渠道 业务分成 努力成本共担 协调 

分 类 号：F626[经济管理—产业经济]