我国商业银行高层薪酬业绩敏感性研究——来自银行业上市公司的经验证据  

China's Commercial Banks Performance Sensitivity of Executive Compensation

作　　者：宋涛[1] 陈晓慧[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行南京分行,江苏南京210004 [2]南京财经大学,江苏南京210046

出　　处：《区域金融研究》2015年第12期58-62,共5页Journal of Regional Financial Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金项目;江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目"商业银行操作风险管理状况综合评价及其应用研究"(2011YJA790133;2011SJB790011)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：以16家上市商业银行为样本,以2010年银监会发布《商业银行稳健薪酬监管指引》至2014底为研究时段,研究我国商业银行高层薪酬业绩敏感性问题,在文献回顾和理论分析的基础上提出了两个研究假设,初步构建了多元线性影响因素模型和粘性特征分析模型。研究发现,银行业绩对高层人员薪酬具有显著正向作用,资产规模、资本结构和股权激励情况对薪酬会产生显著正向影响,但同时银行高层薪酬存在粘性特征,高股权集中度降低了高层薪酬水平。最后,为完善银行业薪酬契约设计、业绩考核制度和公司治理提出了对策建议,并就"央企限薪令"提出了研究展望。With 16 listed commercial banks as samples from the CBRC issued ＂commercial banks pay sound regulatory guidelines, ＂ to the end of 2014 for the study period, the paper studies on Chinese commercial banks performance sensitivity executive compensation issues. Based on the literature review and theoretical analysis the paper proposes two research hypothesis, initially constructs multivariate linear factors model and viscosity characteristics of the model. The study finds that bank performance pay for senior executives has a significant positive effect on asset size, capital structure and equity incentive program have to pay a significant positive impact, but at the same time the bank executive compensation, viscosity characteristics and high ownership concentration reduces executive compensation level. Finally, to improve the banking sector salary contract design, the paper puts forward suggestions about performance appraisal system and improving corporate governance, and proposes research prospects about the central rate salary limit order.

关 键 词：高层薪酬 银行业绩 敏感性 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]