重大工程工厂化预制的动态协调激励  

The Dynamic and Coordinative Incentive of Mega Project Fabrication

作　　者：时茜茜[1] 盛昭瀚[1] 朱建波[1] 李迁[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《系统工程》2015年第11期94-100,共7页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大资助项目(71390520);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271107;71301062;71201073;71571098);"十一五"国家科技支撑计划项目(2011BAG07B00);交通运输部建设科技项目(2013318282310)

摘　　要：重大工程工厂化预制情形下,业主不同时期对工厂化预制商生产质量和工期的关注存在差异化。基于此,本文构建了业主对工厂化预制商的动态激励模型,分两阶段调整控制目标的激励强度,探讨工厂化预制商的特征对整体激励效果的影响,给出业主的最优激励策略及算例分析。研究表明,两阶段动态协调激励更贴近工厂化预制需求,业主通过两阶段动态激励契约降低了合作双方的信息不对称,促使工厂化预制商在工期-质量目标上合理分配努力水平和资源,不仅实现控制目标的协调均衡,也实现合作双方净收益的帕累托改善。With regard to mega project fabrication, there are differences in owners＇ attention to the manufactured duration and quality of fabricated factory in different stages. Therefore, this paper designs a two-stage incentive contract based on two observation period, studies the impact of the supplier＇s characteristics on overall incentive effect, and gives the optimal incentive strategies and related policy recommendations. The research shows that two-stage dynamic and coordinative incentive is more suitable for fabrication demand. Owners reduce the degree of asymmetric information through the contract and make the fabricated factory reasonably allocate the effort level and resources between the duration and quality objective which can not only realize duration-quality coordinative equilibrium, but also realize net earnings, and Pareto improvement between owners and fabricated factory.

关 键 词：工厂化预制 重大工程 协调均衡 动态激励 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]