竞标者合谋均衡分析:从单期静态拍卖到重复动态拍卖  

Equilibrium Analysis on Bidder Collusion:From One-Period Static Auction to Repeated Dynamic Auction

作　　者：王宏[1] 陈宏民[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出　　处：《产业经济评论（山东）》2010年第2期86-122,共37页Review of Industrial Economics

摘　　要：本文假设合谋竞标者在拍卖之前采用第二价格预拍的合谋机制,分别在单期静态拍卖和重复动态拍卖的背景下,求解了第一价格拍卖和第二价格拍卖下的合谋均衡。我们不但考虑了拍卖方对于合谋的最优策略性响应,而且考虑了参与合谋的竞标者与没有参与合谋的竞标者之间的策略性响应,主要结论表明:(1)没有参与合谋的竞标者为了抵消合谋竞标者对于自己的不利影响,在竞价时考虑到合谋的存在会比不存在合谋条件下的竞价更具有进取性;(2)与第一价格拍卖相比,第二价格拍卖下的合谋更容易实现;(3)在重复动态拍卖中,给定保留价格,强卡特尔下的合谋比弱卡特尔下的合谋更容易实现;(4)无论在单期静态拍卖还是重复动态拍卖下,拍卖方合理的设定保留价格对于合谋的难易均有重要影响。We suppose collusive bidders adopt the second price pre-auction knock-out to select the effective bidder as the cartel's representative to attend the main auction,solve the collusion equilibrium of the FPA and SPA under the background of one-period static auction and repeated dynamic auction respectively.We take into account auctioneer's optimal strategic response to bidder collusion as well as the strategic response between cartel members and non-cartel members.The main conclusions indicate that:(1)in order to counteract disadvantage from cartel members,the bidding of non-cartel members will become more aggressive;(2)compared to the FPA,bidder collusion in the SPA can be sustained more easily;(3)given reserve price,bidder collusion in strong cartel can be more easily sustained than in weak cartel under dynamic auction;(4)whether in static auction or in dynamic auction,setting a reasonable reserve price has significant effect on bidder collusion.

关 键 词：竞标者合谋 保留价格 重复拍卖 

分 类 号：F713.359[经济管理—产业经济] F224