创新资助信号博弈模型研究  

Research on Signal Transmission Game Mode of Innovation Funding

作　　者：聂规划[1] 郭萌[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学经济学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第1期54-60,共7页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家科技支撑计划项目(2012BAH93F04);国家自然科学基金项目(71172043)

摘　　要：随着创新驱动战略的深入发展,创新资助政策实施力度迅速提升。考虑到创新资助过程中因信息不对称和不完备而导致的逆向选择,并因之造成政府创新资助中资金效益低、资源配置不合理的问题,构建了政企创新资助信号博弈模型,并分析了双方均衡策略的选择机制及影响因素,研究发现:政企博弈中出现"探索均衡"、"发展均衡"、"完美均衡"三种均衡,均衡主要受企业伪装成本、振荡收益等影响。为此,增加企业伪装成本、提。为此高振荡收益等方式,能有效降低政府对创新资助申报中企业类型的误判概率,促进政府针对不同企业类型给予差异化资助,在提高企业创新积极性的同时应保证资金效益最大化和资源合理配置。With the deep development innovation-driven strategies,the efforts of innovation funding policy improve rapidly.The information asymmetry and incompleteness in the process of innovation funding lead to adverse selection problem,low capital efficiency and the unreasonable allocation of resources in the government innovation funding.Therefore,we build a signal transmission game model of government and enterprise innovation funding,analyze both equilibrium strategy selection mechanism and its impacting factors.It＇s found that three equilibria of＂exploration,development and perfection＂have appeared in the government and enterprise game.They are mainly affected by disguise cost and the oscillation income of the enterprise.According to this,increasing enterprise＇disguise cost and oscillation income can effectively reduce errors in deciding the type of innovative businesses for the government funding and promote the government implement corresponding funding for different types of enterprises,so as to improve the enthusiasm of the enterprise innovation while ensuring the reasonable resource configuration.

关 键 词：创新资助 信号博弈模型 博弈均衡 资金效益 

分 类 号：F062.3[经济管理—政治经济学]