独立许可、专利池与一体化:累积创新中的厂商行为  

Separate License,Patent Pool and Integration: Firm Behavior in Cumulative Innovation

作　　者：江喜林[1] 董亮[2] 易艳春[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北师范学院,湖北黄石435002 [2]桂林电子科技大学,广西桂林541004

出　　处：《中国科技论坛》2016年第2期147-153,共7页Forum on Science and Technology in China

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目"我国城镇化阶段的低碳发展路径研究"(14BJY068);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"农业支持政策执行机制及其优化研究"(15YJC790035)

摘　　要：在技术创新活动中,专利授权形成的"专利丛林"阻碍了技术创新和应用推广的进程,这种"反公共地悲剧"可以通过组建专利池或实施纵向一体化予以缓解。当上游专利之外存在研发效率较高的潜在竞争者时,已有专利、竞争性专利开发者和生产厂商之间的博弈会打破这种合作困境,从而有利于实现有效率的市场结果。这为公共部门的规制政策提供思路,公共部门可以为上游专利的潜在进入者提供各种形式的资助以提高潜在进入者的研发效率。In technological innovation activities,patent jungle which originates from patent licensing hinder the promotion of technological innovation and application process. This phenomenon is called tragedy of the anti-commons,which can be mitigated through the formation of patent pools or implementation of vertical integration. Formation of patent pool,vertical integration or other forms of integration is a Pareto improvement in the cumulative innovation of complementary,but the combination of patents and production companies as a business is the most efficient market results. An important obstacle to the realization of this result is the game between the patent holders,which forms a cooperative dilemma of patent licensing. When the high RD efficiency potential competitors exist outside of upstream patents,the game between the original patent,patent developers and manufacturer will break the plight of the cooperation,which is conducive to the realization of efficient market outcomes. This provides ideas for public sector in regulatory policy. Public sector can provide various forms of support for the potential entrants to the upstream patents,the purpose of that is to improve the development efficiency of potential entrants.

关 键 词：累积创新 “反公共地悲剧”问题 专利授权 一体化 

分 类 号：F403.6[经济管理—产业经济]