Key recovery attack for PRESENT using slender-set linear cryptanalysis  

作　　者：Guoqiang LU Chenhui JIN Zhiyin KONG 

机构地区：[1]Information Engineering University,Zhengzhou 450000,China [2]science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory,Beijing 100072,China

出　　处：《Science China(Information Sciences)》2016年第3期119-132,共14页中国科学（信息科学）（英文版）

基　　金：supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.61272488;61402523);Foundation of Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory(Grant No.KJ-13-007)

摘　　要：In this paper, we propose a new n-round key recovery attack using modified slender-set linear cryptanalysis on PRESENT-like cipher with public S-boxes. In our attack, an effective method for distinguishing the right key from the wrong ones is presented. We apply our attack to PRESENT-80. The experiments show that we can recover the entire 80 key bits of 12-rounds PRESENT-80 with 232 data complexity, 236 time complexity, and negligible memory complexity. Furthermore, we investigate an （n＋1）-round attack by extending the n-round key recovery attack. Our method can be used in most PRESENT-like ciphers where the linear layer is a bit-wise permutation.In this paper, we propose a new n-round key recovery attack using modified slender-set linear cryptanalysis on PRESENT-like cipher with public S-boxes. In our attack, an effective method for distinguishing the right key from the wrong ones is presented. We apply our attack to PRESENT-80. The experiments show that we can recover the entire 80 key bits of 12-rounds PRESENT-80 with 232 data complexity, 236 time complexity, and negligible memory complexity. Furthermore, we investigate an （n＋1）-round attack by extending the n-round key recovery attack. Our method can be used in most PRESENT-like ciphers where the linear layer is a bit-wise permutation.

关 键 词：block cipher linear cryptanalysis slender-set PRESENT cipher S-BOX 

分 类 号：TN918.2[电子电信—通信与信息系统] TP393.08[电子电信—信息与通信工程]