中国农贷的“精英俘获”机制:贫困县与非贫困县的分层比较  

Elite Capture of Rural Credit Market in China:Stratified Comparison between Poor and Non-poor Counties

作　　者：温涛[1] 朱炯[1] 王小华[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《经济研究》2016年第2期111-125,共15页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家社科基金重大招标项目(11&ZD047);教育部人文社科青年基金项目(13YJC790149);教育部高等学校博士学科点专项基金(博导类:20130182110025);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(SWU1509106)的资助

摘　　要：农贷资金进入乡村需要寻求内部化节约交易成本的主体与其对接,这一角色通常由乡村精英担任。而在"去组织化"的制度安排中,精英行为越发偏离整体利益,农贷资金呈现出被精英占有的"精英俘获"机制。本文采用两阶段最小二乘回归和工具变量分位数回归方法,利用全国10省区的调查问卷数据,分层比较了贫困县和非贫困县农贷市场的"精英俘获"机制。结果发现:贫困县和非贫困县农贷市场的"精英俘获"机制差异明显。贫困县农贷市场尚不存在明显的"精英俘获"机制;但"精英俘获"机制泛滥于非贫困县农贷市场,使得农贷市场结构扭曲、功能错位、目标偏离。亟待建立普惠金融体系,破解现有农贷资金配置固化的格局,保障农贷资金公平地惠及农户,助力农贷市场精英与普通农户协同发展机制的建立。Providing cheap credit fund to rural residents needs to look into the main body that is usually controlled by elite with low transaction cost. In the long term, the behavior of elite deviates from the overall interests, and ＂elite capture＂ mechanism is developed in rural credit market. This paper conducts an empirical research based on the data of the questionnaires survey from 10 provinces in China, to study the ＂elite capture＂ mechanism of rural credit market via the 2SLS model and IVQR model. The results showed that the ＂elite capture＂ mechanism in non-poor counties is significantly different from that of poor counties. ＂Elite capture＂ mechanism of rural credit market in poor counties has not been formed completely. In contrast to non-poor counties where ＂elite capture＂ mechanism is widely distributed over rural credit market, leading to structure distortions, function dislocation and target deviation. It＇s necessary to establish an inclusive financial system to break the existing configuration, to ensure fair transfer of funds and to establish a co-development mechanism.

关 键 词：农户信贷 精英俘获 两阶段最小二乘回归 工具变量分位数回归 

分 类 号：F832.43[经济管理—金融学]