美国证券分析师监管法律实施效果述评与借鉴  

Review of U.S Securities Analysts' Regulation and Implication

作　　者：王宇熹[1] 谢鲁江[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学管理学院,上海2016202 [2]中共中央党校经济学部,北京100091

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2016年第2期72-78,共7页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：卖方证券分析师具备影响股票价格的信息垄断优势,近年美国监管部门从保护中小投资者角度出发,围绕如何降低分析师利益冲突,预防机构利用分析师信息垄断优势获利制定了一系列法律法规,但效果仍然存在一定争议。本文系统梳理了美国《公平披露法案》、《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》、《全球分析师和解协议》、《多德-弗兰克法案》这四个最重要的分析师监管法律规则的实施效果,分析了美国分析师监管中出现的新问题,提出了完善我国分析师监管法律规则的建议。Sell-side securities analysts have the information monopoly advantage that affects the stock price. From the point of protecting small investors, the United States regulators apply a series of laws and regulations focusing on how to reduce the conflict of interests behind the analyst and preventing institutions from abusing analyst information. But there are still some disputes about the effects of the relevant regulations. This paper first systematically reviews the effect of the implementation of the four most important regulations on the supervision of the analyst： Fair Disclosure Act, the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the Global Analyst Settlement Agreement, Dodd-Frank Act. Then the author analyses the new problems emerging in American regulation of the analysts. Finally, the author proposes suggestions on improving the laws of Chinese analysts supervision.

关 键 词：证券分析师监管 利益冲突 公平披露法案 全球分析师和解协议 

分 类 号：DF438[政治法律—经济法学]