上市公司私有化的监管逻辑与路径选择  

The Supervision Logic and Path Choice for Listed Company Privatization

作　　者：李文莉[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学法学院

出　　处：《中国法学》2016年第1期194-209,共16页China Legal Science

基　　金：司法部2014年度国家法治与法学理论研究项目"证券发行注册制的法理内核与审核机制研究"(项目批准号:14SFB4007)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：绝对禁止与受损者合理补偿的法理之辩、投资者保护与公司自由兼顾之监管逻辑,为我国上市公司私有化监管提供理论基础。上市公司私有化监管从"实质审查"到"法定披露"之演变,体现了投资者保护与公司自由之间的利益平衡。通过考察中美上市公司私有化的实证数据,探索数据背后我国资本市场生态破坏、私有化需求不足深层次的原因是总量控制之证券发行制度。应借鉴域外以信息披露为核心的类型化证券监管与公平性司法审查并重之路径,确立公司退市自由与投资者利益合理补偿兼顾之理念,联动修改《证券法》和《公司法》的相关规定。The absolute prohibition of legal debate on reasonable compensation with impaired people and the supervision logic of investor protection and company freedom provide theoretical basis for our country＇ s listed company privatization supervision. The supervision of listed company privatization transforms from substantive examination to statutory disclosure, which shows the interests balance between investor protection and company freedom. With the empirical data of Chinese and American listed company privatization, the main reason for our country＇ s ecological damage of capital market and insufficient demand of privatization is the securities issuance system of total amount control. We should imitate the extraterritorial method with typed security supervision and judicial justice investigation with information disclosure as its core, set up the idea that balances company delisting freedom and the reasonable compensation of investor interests, and revise related stipulations of Securities Law and Corporate Law.

关 键 词：上市公司私有化 主动退市 上市公司监管 

分 类 号：D922.287[政治法律—经济法学]