不同产学研联盟类型的合作创新与利益分配比较  

作　　者：梁喜[1] 郭瑾[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2016年第2期33-38,共6页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年课题"产学研联盟知识转移促进西部地区自主创新研究"(项目编号:CIA100154)

摘　　要：在单个企业方和单个学研方组成的产学研联盟系统中,当企业方为Stackelberg博弈的领导者而学研方为追随者时,针对松散型、较紧密型和紧密型3种联盟形式,引入了技术创新程度系数、创新补贴系数和利益分配比例,揭示了不同产学研合作模型的利益分配机制,并对不同产学研合作模式的利益分配进行了比较。结果表明:松散型联盟的创新度最低,单位产品利润最低,技术转让价格最高,需求量最小;紧密型联盟的技术转让价格最低,需求量最大,企业方利润和整体利润最大,是最理想的联盟模式;较紧密型联盟的创新度最高,单位产品利润最高,但是所有利润都最低。最后用算例进行了验证。In view of an industry-university-research institute alliance system composed of one enterprise, one university and one re- search institute, when the enterprise is the leader and the university and the institute are the followers, for loose mode, rel- atively close mode and close mode of the alliance, the paper introduces the technology innovation degree coefficient, tech- nology innovation subsidy and benefit distribution ratio to reveal the benefit distribution mechanisms of different alliance modes and makes the comparison for the benefit distribution of different modes. The results show that the loose mode has the maximum transfer price but the minimum unit product demand, unit product profits and innovation degree; the close mode is the optimal choice because of its lowest transfer price, the maximum product demand and the highest total profits; and the relatively close mode has the maximum innovation degree, the maximum unit product profits and the minimum to- tal profits. At last, the paper verifies the results by example calculation.

关 键 词：产学研联盟 技术创新 创新补贴 利益分配 

分 类 号：F124.3[经济管理—世界经济] F224