县域间土地供给竞合关系演化博弈模型  

Evolutionary Game Model on Competition and Cooperation between Counties in Land-supplied Process

作　　者：郭本海[1,2] 李军强[1] 刘思峰[2] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013 [2]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2015年第12期77-85,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然基金资助项目(71173106;71403109);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2011ZDIXM057);江苏大学高级技术人才项目(13JDG124)

摘　　要：基于经济发达县域与经济不发达县域在土地供给中的竞合关系,构建演化博弈模型;在模型求解基础上,根据不同典型情形分析演化稳定策略的走向与收敛趋势。研究结果表明,县域政府在土地供给中是否采取相互合作的策略,很大程度上取决于上级政府的监察力度、自身的产业增值收益和基础设施建设成本。Based on the land supply competition and cooperation relationships between developed and developing counties, a evolutionary game model is established; According to this model and lots of research on different typical cases, the directions and tendencies of convergence of evolutionary stable strategy are finally analyzed; The results prove that, whether the county governments will take the strategy of mutual cooperation in land supply policy, is largely depended on the inspection from the superior governments, value-added benefits from the local industry and the costs of infrastructure construction.

关 键 词：县域经济 土地供给 竞合关系 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224.1[经济管理—国民经济]