地方政府财政支出竞争与经济增长效应:基于策略互动视角  

The Competition of Local Governments' Fiscal Expenditure and the Effect upon Economic Growth

作　　者：王华春[1] 刘清杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学政府管理学院,北京100875

出　　处：《广东财经大学学报》2016年第1期89-97,共9页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：北京市支持中央在京高校共建项目"公共管理重点学科建设"(2015-2016)

摘　　要：根据政治晋升博弈理论构建地区财政支出竞争理论假设,通过估计空间杜宾模型寻找经验证据。研究表明:相比于其他支出项,经济性支出表现出显著的空间策略互补特征,存在更为激烈的地区竞争,且在短期内对经济增长具有显著的刺激作用,长期内则不显著;社会性支出对本地区的经济增长影响模糊,短期内显著抑制竞争地区的经济发展,空间上也存在显著的支出竞争态势。晋升锦标赛下的政治晋升博弈引导地方政府官员在任期内展开以GDP为锦标的绩效竞争,由此引致的经济增长不可持续。适应经济增长新常态,亟需规范地区财政收支关系,完善官员绩效考核指标,围绕改善民生需求加大社会性财政支出,以促进经济的可持续发展。The paper builds the theoretical hypothesis of regional fiscal expenditure competition based on the game theory in political promotion tournament, and tests it by estimating the Space Durbin Model. The results show that, compared to other types of spending, economic spending has significant complementary characteristics of spatial strategies, and exists a more intense competition between regions. In the short term, it has a significant stimulation effect upon economic growth, but in the long term, it is not so. The influence of social spending in the region＇s economic growth effect is ambiguous, but in the short term, it has a significant inhibitory effect upon competitors＇ economic growth, and it also exists a significant spending competition between the regions. The political promotion tournament game under promotion championship causes the lo- cal government officials to compete with GDP as trophy performance during their tenure, thus leading to the economic growth which is unsustainable. In order to adapt the new normal economic growth, it is of importance to regulate the relationship of regional financial revenue and expenditure, and to revaluate the official performance evaluation indicators and the goal of improving the people＇s livelihood, so as to promote the sustainable development of economy.

关 键 词：经济增长 财政支出 地方政府 晋升锦标赛 支出竞争 绩效考核 

分 类 号：F812.45[经济管理—财政学] F127