基于不对称Nash协商模型的移动增值服务价值链协调研究  

Coordination Research on the Value Chain of Mobile Value-added Service Based on Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model

作　　者：徐慧婷[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门城市职业学院中小企业电子商务化服务和发展研究中心,厦门361000

出　　处：《江南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2016年第1期126-130,共5页Journal of Jiangnan University：Humanities & Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：从合作博弈的角度运用不对称Nash协商模型分析了电信运营商和网络服务提供商构成的移动增值服务价值链的协调问题。首先,建立非合作博弈下的Stacklberg模型,求出各自利润的最优解;再次,以Stacklberg模型下的最优利润为谈判起点,用不对称Nash协商模型来协调双方的利润,得出不对称Nash协商模型下通信费、信息服务费及各自利润表达式;最后,用算例证明,上述Nash协商模型能增加双方利润,从而实现了价值链的协调。From the perspective of cooperative game, the article analyzes the coordination issue of the value chain of mobile value-added service in mobile network operator （MNO） and network service providers （SP） by using asymmetric Nash negotiation model. Firstly, we establish the Stacklberg model based on the non-cooperative game model and get the optimal solution for each profit. Secondly, we make the optimal profit of Stacklberg game model for the negotiation＇s starting point, using the asymmetric Nash negotiation model to coordinate the two parties＂ profits and get the expressions of the communication fee, information service charge, profits of the two patties and the joint profits of the whole value chain. Lastly, we provide a numerical example which illustrates that the above Nash negotiation model can increase the profits of both of the parties and achieve the coordination of the value chain.

关 键 词：移动增值服务 合作博弈 不对称Nash协商模型 价值链 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]