资源型产业集群演化机理研究——基于利益主体间演化博弈和仿真视角  

Research on the mechanism of evolution of resource-based industrial cluster: Based on evolutionary game theory and the simulation among the interest subjects

作　　者：傅沂[1] 杨修进[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第1期106-113,共8页Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences

基　　金：湖南省社科基金"演化经济学视角下制度变迁的路径依赖研究"(09YBB412);湖南省软科学项目"长株潭两型社会建设中产业升级的路径依赖及超越研究"(2009ZK3192)

摘　　要：作为我国欠发达地区经济发展与转型的重要支撑,资源型产业集群发挥着越来越重要的作用。因此,把握资源型产业集群演化机理,探索利益主体间行为选择的影响因素,对于这些区域的经济转型和可持续发展具有重要意义。基于此,利用演化博弈模型,构建地方政府与企业群体策略互动的支付矩阵,借助其互动过程的演化模型,揭示政府监管程度与企业对待违规态度间的成本、收益交互影响机制,并借助数值仿真演示不同参数变化对演化趋势的影响。研究显示,地方政府监管成本过高与激励不足、企业不违规时自身收益较低以及政府补贴方式不健全等因素是演化稳定策略偏离高效率的重要原因。As an effective form of regional economic development, resource-based industrial cluster continues to show its superiority and plasticity around the world. Therefore, for the healthy development of the resource type industry and ecological transformation, it is of essential importance to grasp the mechanism of the evolution of resource-based industrial cluster, and to explore the impact factors of interest subject’s behavior choice. Based on this, the present essay adopts the evolutionary game model to construct payment matrix of strategic interaction between the government and enterprise group, resorts to the interaction process of evolution model to disclose the cost, income interaction mechanism between the degree of the government supervision and the attitude with which the enterprise treats defaults, and finally demonstrates the influence of various parameters on the evolution trend with the help of numerical simulation. Findings reveal that major reasons that strategy for evolution equilibrium deviates from optimal efficiency lie in the excessive high cost of the local governments’ supervision, lack of motivation, the enterprises’ low revenue in non-violation, the unsound government subsidy, and so on.

关 键 词：资源型产业集群 地方政府 企业群体 演化博弈 数值仿真 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]