废旧电器再生利用市场准入许可共谋行为博弈分析  

The Game Analysis of the Collusion Behavior of Recycling Market Access License for Waste Recycling

作　　者：郭汉丁[1] 张印贤[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津城建大学经济与管理学院,天津300384

出　　处：《中国资源综合利用》2016年第1期33-37,共5页China Resources Comprehensive Utilization

基　　金：国家自然基金项目(71573188):废旧电器再生利用生态产业链完整社会契约集成优化机理研究;教育部人文社会科学研究项目(11YJA630203):废旧电器回收再生利用产业链主体责任分配机理及其协同机制研究

摘　　要：《废弃电器电子产品回收处理管理条例》规定,废旧电器再生利用实施市场准入制度,其本质是委托代理关系。在市场准入决策过程中,由于生态化处理补贴的确定性与授权特征,政府管理部门管理者与再生企业为了追求政绩、业绩和补贴收益,易形成串通作弊、寻求潜在资本收益的现象。通过政府管理部门与再生企业委托代理与市场准入审批过程的共谋行为分析,揭示了政府管理部门与再生企业在废旧电器生态化处理准入审批过程中行为策略选择的潜在动因。分析认为,消除共谋行为需要引入市场竞争机制、实施绩效考核与激励、提高管理者的待遇。The market access system on the reuse of waste electrical appliance is stipulated in the treatment management regulations on the recycling of waste electrical appliance, and its nature is principal-agent relationship. Because of its special characteristics in uncertainty and authorization on ecological treatment of subsidies, the managers and recyclers easily form undesirable phenomen in the decision-making process of market access, such as collusion, potential capital gains. By collusive behavior analysis of the government departments and recyclers, the paper reveals the potential motivation that the managers and recyclers choose behavior strategies in the waste electrical access approval process, and indicate that eliminating collusion needs introducing market competition mechanism, implementing performance evaluation and incentive and improving treatment of managers.

关 键 词：废旧电器 市场准入 共谋行为 策略与对策 

分 类 号：X705[环境科学与工程—环境工程]