城市拆迁群体性事件演化机理的多情景演化博弈分析  

Multi-scenario Evolutionary Game Analysis of Evolutionary Mechanism in Urban Demolition Mass Incident

作　　者：刘德海[1,2] 韩呈军 尹丽娟[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2016年第1期76-84,共9页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71571033;71171035;71271045);东北财经大学学科建设支持计划特色学科项目(XKT-201411)

摘　　要：加强和创新社会管理,妥善处置城市拆迁群体性突发事件是各级政府面临的重大挑战。城市公益性拆迁纠纷中,地方政府出于政绩竞争和执政理念的差异,存在着合理补偿或强制拆迁等多种备选模式;被拆迁户由于搬迁意愿和经济状况等差异,存在着利益受损下采取合理诉求或者在"闹大"心理驱使下采取过激行动等复杂行为类型。通过将城市拆迁问题的演化博弈模型与不同对抗成本下的情景预设相结合,研究城市拆迁突发事件中地方政府和被拆迁户之间博弈冲突多种情景下各种演化结果,以及城市拆迁突发事件的影响因素。研究结果表明,地方政府实施城市拆迁项目是否诱发群体性突发事件,其概率取决于一系列非常复杂的影响因素。一些重要的影响因素对于诱发群体性事件概率的影响,并不存在着简单的线性关系。尤其是,地方政府部门与被拆迁户之间在拆迁改造项目的成本和收益上,均存在着两个相互关联的最优分配比例。In the conflict of urban public welfare demolition, local government may choose the multiple methods including reasonable compensation or forced demolition considering the record of achievements, and dismantled households may take the complex behaviors including reasonable appeals for their damaged benefit or radical ac- tion driven by the escalated psychology. Through integrated evolutionary game model with scenario hypothesis of urban demolition problem, the paper researches the various conflict evolutionary- results and the influence factors between local governments and dismantled households. The results show that the occurrence probability of urban demolition mass incident should depend on a series of complex influences. Some important influences on the occurrence probability are not the simple linear relationship. Especially, there is an optimal sharing proportion of demolition cost-benefit between the local government and the dismantled households.

关 键 词：应急管理 演化机理 演化博弈 公益性拆迁 群体性突发事件 情景分析 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]