绿色建筑运营管理主体行为进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Players' Behavior of Green Building Operation Management

作　　者：刘戈[1,2] 刘伟[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]天津城建大学经济与管理学院,天津300384 [2]天津市城镇化与新农村建设研究中心,天津300384

出　　处：《建筑经济》2016年第3期89-93,共5页Construction Economy

基　　金："十二五"国家科技支撑计划研究项目"天津生态城绿色建筑运营管理关键技术集成与示范"(2013BAJ09B03)

摘　　要：绿色建筑快速发展,但设计标识项目与运行标识项目数量比例严重不协调。结合绿色建筑运营管理,首先分析物业管理企业和业主这两个关键主体的博弈行为,然后引入政府行为,分析在政府补贴影响下的动态演化路径,得出此时物业管理企业和业主更倾向演进为绿色运营。据此提出应制定绿色建筑运营管理的激励政策,加大支持力度,从动力上保障绿色建筑运营管理发展的建议。Green buildings develop rapidly,but the proportion of design identifications and operation identifications is seriously uncoordinated. Combined with green building operation management,the paper analyzes the game behavior of two key subjects named the property management companies and owners. Then introduces government behavior and analyzes the dynamic evolution path under the inf luence of government subsidy,comes to the conclusion that both of the property management companies and owners tend to evolve to green operation,provides suggestions that the government should formulate the incentive policy of green building operation management,increase industry revenue of property management companies and intensity of the owners to support green operations management,ensure the development of green building operation management from the dynamic.

关 键 词：绿色建筑 运营管理 主体 进化博弈 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]