虚拟供应链平台企业质量构成分析  

Analysis of Virtual Supply Chain Platform Enterprise Quality Constitution

作　　者：王瑞[1] 曹玉红[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《同济大学学报（自然科学版）》2016年第2期317-323,共7页Journal of Tongji University:Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然基金(71402090)

摘　　要：虚拟供应链平台要在市场竞争中取胜,就要面对质量控制问题.平台质量水平呈现受企业质量水平影响,因此可以从企业质量水平构成入手研究平台的质量水平控制问题.运用声誉模型建立不完美信息静态博弈模型,分析博弈进行一期、二期和多期,以及顾客先验概率不变或改变的情况下的最优策略选择.得出结论:当博弈大于二期时,只要高质量水平企业的数量大于一定比例,平台整体呈现高质量水平;顾客先验概率是否随着博弈结果调整不会影响均衡解的路径.这个比例可以作为虚拟供应链平台企业选择的参考.It is inevitable that the virtual supply chain confronts the problem of quality control if it wants to win the competition in the market.The overall presence of platform quality is influenced by the quality of enterprises.Therefore,the research on the platform quality control should be focused on the constitution of the quality of enterprises.Based on the reputation model,an imperfect information static game model was established to analyze the optimal strategy.It is concluded that when the game is carried out twice or more,the platform presents high quantity only if the high quality enterprise quantity ratio is greater than a certain a value.It cannot influence the equilibrium solution path if the prior probability changes with the game result.The ratio can be used as the reference of the selection of platform enterprise.

关 键 词：虚拟供应链 虚拟供应链平台 质量控制 声誉模型 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]