国家动员及其效果:以反腐败为例  

Political Mobilization and Its Effect:Taking Anti-corruption for Example

作　　者：赖诗攀[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学公共管理学院

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第1期13-20,共8页Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(11CGL094)

摘　　要：借鉴公共和私人官僚制理论分析思路,从现有文献中,可以归纳出动员式治理的三个动员机制:强化激励、行政控制和资源动员。以十八大以来的腐败治理为例,对Q市258个机构问卷调查数据的分析结果表明:反腐动员使得显性和隐性两类腐败行为发生频率都明显下降,且显性腐败行为治理效果更佳。两类腐败行为发生频率都受到十八大前发生频率的影响,体现出明显的路径依赖效应。三个动员机制均在反腐风暴中得到运用,但其效果有所不同。组织系统内部临时性资源动员未对腐败行为产生影响。问责力度和具有法治意义的行政控制都起到了抑制腐败行为的作用。反腐败这一自我革命型政治动员,其动员机制的特殊性值得强调。维持腐败惩处力度并进一步推动法治进程是腐败治理的有效方式。Political mobilization mechanisms and their effects are studied in this paper. Drawing on insights from organizational economics, three mechanisms of political mobilization, strengthening incentive, administrative control and resource mobilization, are concluded firstly. Taking anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress as an example to carry out an empirical study, we find that the anti-corruption campaign makes the frequency of both implicit and explicit corrupt behavior decrease significantly. The occurrence of corrupt behavior reflects the path dependence effect. Strengthening incentive, administrative control and resource mobilization are three mobilization mechanisms of the anti corruption campaign, but the effects of them are conditional. Compared with the temporary resource mobilization of internal organization, the punishment intensity and administrative control are more effective governance instruments of corruption.

关 键 词：公共部门腐败行为 动员机制 激励力度 行政控制 资源动员 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学]